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I.  Introduction 
 
A.  Overview  
 
Since the Nation’s founding, agricultural production has 
been treated differently than other industries.  This concept, known 
as “agricultural exceptionalism,” has manifested in many different 
ways throughout U.S. history.1  Since the 1990s, one manifestation 
of agricultural exceptionalism has been the enactment of “Ag-gag 
laws,” state laws that limit information gathering activities at 
animal production facilities.2  Ag-gag laws are frequently criticized 
by animal welfare advocates and legal scholars for seeking to shield 
 
* Author received her J.D. from the University of Colorado Law School in 2018 
and received her LL.M in Agriculture and Food Law from the University of 
Arkansas School of Law in May 2019. She is grateful for Professor Susan 
Schneider's assistance editing this article. 
1 For example, the agriculture industry is exempted from federal labor laws, 
environmental regulations, and antitrust restrictions.  See Susan Schneider, A 
reconsideration of Agricultural Law: A Call for the Law of Food, Farming, and 
Sustainability, 34 WM. & MARY J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 935, 935–36 (2010) 
(discussing the history of agriculture law in the U.S. and arguing for a new 
paradigm for the special treatment afforded agriculture under the law).  
2 It should be noted that Ag-gag laws generally apply to “processing activities” and 
“farming activities.”  Traditionally, agricultural exceptionalism applies to the 
latter, but not the former, and the distinction is not trivial.  For example, the 
exemptions afforded to agriculture under the Fair Labor Standards Act is a form of 
agricultural exceptionalism, and the exemptions do not extend to workers in 
processing. The Supreme Court has held that chicken catchers are not agricultural 
workers and therefore not exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act overtime pay 
provisions.  See Herman v. Tyson Foods, Inc. 82 F. Supp. 2d 631 (2000). By 
contrast, Ag-gag statutes attempt to expand the umbrella of agricultural 
exceptionalism to also include processing activities.  
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animal production facilities3 from public scrutiny, a state-
sanctioned protection not afforded to other industries.4    
 
Early Ag-gag laws were enacted to protect agriculture 
facilities from trespass and property damage, known as “agriculture 
interference laws.”5  After 2011, a second wave of Ag-gag laws 
were enacted, focusing solely on information gathering activities.6  
Six states currently have Ag-gag laws which have not been 
challenged in court; one state (Kansas) currently has Ag-gag 
litigation pending; and in four states, Ag-gag laws have been ruled 
unconstitutional.78 
 
3 By “animal production facility” I refer to feedlots, slaughterhouses, and livestock 
processing facilities, although the term might also include animal research 
facilities.  For example, the Kansas Farm Animal and Field Crop and Research 
Facilities Protection Act defines “animal facility” as including “any vehicle, 
building, structure, research facility or premises where an animal is kept, handled, 
housed, exhibited, bred or offered for sale.”  KY. STAT. ANN. § 47-1826(b) (2018).  
In this paper, I use the terms “animal production facility,” “animal facility,” and 
“agriculture facility” to mean the same thing. 
4 See generally Matthew Shea, Punishing Animal Rights Activists for Animal 
Abuse: Rapid Reporting and the New Wave of Ag-Gag Laws, 48 COLUM. J. L. & 
SOC. PROBS. 337 (2015) (discussing the arguments made against Ag-gag laws, 
particularly the most recent generation of Ag-gag laws requiring rapid reporting to 
local authorities and the damaging effects these laws have for promotion of animal 
welfare).  
5 Alicia Prygoski, Detailed Discussion of Ag-gag Laws, MICH.  ST. U. ANIMAL 
LEGAL & HIST. CTR., https://www.animallaw.info/article/detailed-discussion-ag-
gag-laws (last visited Feb. 28, 2018). 
6 Id.  
7 The states with Ag-gag laws in the books include Montana, North Dakota, 
Kansas, Missouri, Arkansas, Alabama and North Carolina.  Ag-gag laws in Idaho, 
Utah, Wyoming, and Iowa have been ruled unconstitutional.  What is Ag-Gag 
Legislation?, AM. SOC. FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS, 
https://www.aspca.org/animal-protection/public-policy/what-ag-gag-
legislation#Ag-Gag%20by%20State (last visited Feb. 28, 2018).  
8 This paper does not discuss the Wyoming Ag-gag law because it does not solely 
target speech activities pertaining to animal facilities. WYO. STAT. ANN. . § 6-3-414 
(2016) and WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40- 27-101 (2016) were nearly identical statutes 
which imposed civil and criminal penalties, respectively, for entering private land 
for the purpose of collecting resource data or crossing private land to collect 
resource data. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 
6-3-414 (2016), invalidated by W. Watersheds Project v. Michael, No. 15-CV-169-
SWS, 2018 WL 5318261 (D. Wyo. Oct. 29, 2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-27-101 
(2016), invalidated by W. Watersheds Project v. Michael, No. 15-CV-169-SWS, 
2018 WL 5318261 (D. Wyo. Oct. 29, 2018). In Western Watershed Project v. 
Michael, the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming held that the 
statutes were content-based restrictions on speech because they only penalized data 
“relating to land or land use.” W. Watersheds Project v. Michael, No. 15-CV-169-
SWS, 2018 WL 5318261, at *8 (D. Wyo. Oct. 29, 2018) (finding that the laws 
failed to meet strict scrutiny, the court deemed the laws unconstitutional). 
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As recent litigation demonstrates, a state’s desire to protect 
animal facilities from public scrutiny through Ag-gag legislation 
frequently clashes with the First Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.  Despite the prominence of agricultural 
exceptionalism in federal and state laws and in U.S. history, where 
agricultural exceptionalism clashes with the U.S. Constitution, the 
former must yield.  
 
The purpose of this article is to discuss the constitutionality 
of the Kansas Ag-gag law, “The Farm Animal and Field Crop and 
Research Facilities Protection Act,” focusing on the First 
Amendment.  It explores the law in light of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence and three recent Ag-gag cases, Animal Legal Defense 
Fund v. Herbert, Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Wasden, and 
Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Reynolds.  The courts in each 
respective case held the states’ Ag-gag laws unconstitutional in part 
or in whole.9   
 
A consideration of the Kansas Ag-gag law’s 
constitutionality is timely because on December 4, 2018, a coalition 
of public interest groups filed suit against the state, arguing the 
Kansas Ag-gag law violates the First Amendment.  This article 
argues that the public interest groups should succeed in its lawsuit 
in part and adds additional perspective on the Kansas Ag-gag law 
by addressing additional First Amendment issues with the law not 
raised by the public interest group’s complaint.    
 
Section One of this paper looks at the Kansas statute and 
the complaint filed by the public interest groups.  Section Two 
discusses the holdings in ALDF v. Herbert, ALDF v. Wasden, and 
ALDF v. Reynolds.  Section Three discusses the First Amendment 
problems with the Kansas law.  As this article discusses below, the 
Kansas law is different from the laws in Idaho, Utah, and Iowa.  
Nevertheless, the two sections of the law which implicate speech 
are unconstitutional and should be struck by the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Kansas.10  
 
 
9 See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2018) 
(upholding and striking aspects of Idaho’s Ag-gag law); Animal Legal Def. Fund 
v. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d 1193, 1198 (D. Utah 2017) (striking Utah’s Ag-gag 
law in its entirety); and Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Reynolds, No. 
417CV00362JEGHCA, 2019 WL 140069 (S.D. Iowa Jan. 9, 2019)(striking Iowa 
Ag-gag on summary judgement). 
10 See KAN. STAT. ANN. §47-1825(a) (2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(c)(4) 
(2018).  
52                 JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY               [Vol.15 
 
B.  Undercover Activities at Animal Facilities: Why They 
Matter  
 
The term “Ag-gag” was coined by food writer Mark 
Bittman in 2011, though the history of animal activism and 
undercover activity goes farther back.11  The first animal cruelty 
indictment occurred in 1999 after People for the Ethical Treatment 
of Animals (PETA) released footage from a three-month 
investigation of animal abuse at Belcross Farm in North Carolina.12  
Today, a YouTube search of “animal production undercover 
investigation” yields countless undercover videos revealing horrific 
animal abuse at farms, slaughterhouses, and processing facilities for 
all types of animals. 
 
These investigations matter foremost because no animal 
should endure abuse. Moreover, a consumer has a right to know 
how her meat arrived on her plate, and undercover investigations 
can help consumers make informed decisions when purchasing 
food.  Also, given the expanding disconnect between consumers 
and food production in our society, and the tight security at animal 
facilities, these investigations may be the only source of 
information disseminated to the public.   
 
 These investigations can also have serious consequences 
for exposed facilities.  For example, footage of graphic chicken 
abuse at an egg production facility, Sparboe Farms, released by 
Mercy for Animals in 2013 led McDonald’s and Target to drop the 
egg supplier.13  In a dramatic example, in 2007, the Humane 
Society released footage of workers torturing cattle at Hallmark 
Meat Packing Co., which raised concerns about mad cow disease 
and led to a massive recall.14  As a result, the slaughterhouse went 
bankrupt.  
 
 
 
11 Mark Bittman, Who Protects the Animals?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2011) 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/26/who-protects-the-animals/?_r=0.   
12 Ted Genoways, Gagged by Big Ag: How Exposing Abuse Became a Crime, 
EARTH FIRST! NEWSWIRE (June 17, 2013), http://earthfirstjournal.org/newswire/201 
3/06/17/gagged-by-big-ag-how-exposing-abuse-became-a-crime/. 
13 Dana Ford, McDonald’s, Target drops egg supplier after animal cruelty report, 
CNN BUSINESS (Nov. 19, 2011), https://www.cnn.com/2011/11/19/business/sparbo 
e-farms-animal-cruelty/index.html. 
14 Wayne Pacelle, Torture on Tape, HUMANE SOC. OF THE U.S. (Jan. 3, 2008) 
https://blog.humanesociety.org/2008/01/calif-cow-abuse.html?credit=blog_post_0 
92509_id5103. 
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C.  State’s Fight Back: From Property Destruction to Free 
Speech  
 
As discussed above, the focus of Ag-gag laws has shifted 
over time.  Laws adopted in the 1990s—such as the Kansas law—
were enacted in response to groups like the Animal Liberation 
Front, which engage in illegal tactics, such as fence cutting, animal 
theft, and arson, to liberate animals.15  The second wave of Ag-gag 
laws, which includes the laws in Idaho, Utah, and Iowa, were 
enacted in response to undercover investigations and do not 
implicate physical conduct.16 
 
This article argues that the term “Ag-gag” applies to any 
law that implicates speech activities at agriculture facilities, 
including laws that mainly target trespass and physical damage.17 A 
full discussion of the evolution of these laws and the semantics of 
what constitutes “Ag-gag” is beyond the scope of this article, but 
merits attention in its own right.18  
 
 
15 See Marshall Tuttle, Finally A Solution? How Animal Legal Defense Fund v. 
Otter Could Affect the Constitutionality of Iowa’s Ag-Gag Law, 21 DRAKE J. 
AGRIC. L. 237, 244 (2016) (discussing the history of Ag-gag legislation in the 
United States).  
16 Prygoski, supra note 5. 
17 See Rita-Marie Cain Reid & Amber Kingery, Putting a Gag on Farm 
Whistleblowers: The Right to Lie and the Right to Remain Silent Confront 
Agricultural Protectionism, 11 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 31, 35–38 (2015) (“The first 
generation of ‘ag-gag’ laws . . . generally concerned trespass and harm to property 
at animal facilities and properties with field crops. Additionally, however, they 
criminalized unauthorized photographing or recording at the 
agriculture facility…. The second wave of ag-gag enactments emphasized new 
ways to chill whistleblowing and 
undercover reporting.”). 
18 For example, whether Ag-gag encompasses “eco-terrorism” laws is open to 
discussion.  See  
Will Potter, Sentinel Species: the Criminalization of Animal Rights Activists as 
“Terrorists,” and What It Means For Civil Liberties in Trump’s America, 95 
DENV. L. REV. 887, 882–83 (2018) (discussing the history of eco-terrorism laws 
and arguing that the term ‘eco-terrorism’ was created by corporate interest groups 
to shift public perception regarding animal activists).  See also Kevin Adam, 
Shooting the Messenger: A Common-Sense Analysis of State “Ag-Gag” 
Legislation Under the First Amendment, 45 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1129, 1166–67 
(2012) (“The AETA has been the subject of extreme criticism, primarily because 
of its disproportionately harsh penalties for conduct that falls outside of what most 
would consider ‘terrorism.’ For example, six animal-rights activists—known 
collectively as the ‘SHAC 7’—were convicted of conspiring to violate the AETA 
and sentenced to four to six years in federal prison for operating a website that was 
used to organize undercover animal-rights investigations.”). 
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II.  Kansas Farm Animal and Field Crop and Research 
Facilities Protection Act  
 
A.  The Nation’s First Ag-Gag Law: Constitutionally 
Suspect Sections  
 
There are many ways for a state to draft Ag-gag legislation.  
As this paper demonstrates, there are major differences in the 
Idaho, Utah, Iowa, and Kansas laws, to varying degrees of 
constitutionality.     
 
The Kansas Farm Animal and Field Crop and Research 
Facilities Protection Act, enacted in 1990, was the nation’s first Ag-
gag law.19  “Animal facility” is defined as “any vehicle, building, 
structure, research facility or premises where an animal is kept, 
handled, housed, exhibited, bred or offered for sale.”20 
 
The Act broadly criminalizes four types of conduct: (1) 
damaging or destroying an animal facility; (2) exercising control 
over an animal facility; (3) entering an animal facility to take 
pictures or recordings of the facility; and (4) remaining at an animal 
facility against the owner’s wishes.21  Each prohibited act requires 
that the actor have “the intent to damage or destroy” the enterprise 
or the enterprise’s property.22  Violation of the Act varies from 
misdemeanor to felony depending on the amount of damage caused 
to the facility.23   
 
Not all sections of the Kansas law are constitutionally 
suspect.  The sections of the law which this article argues violate 
the First Amendment are the focus of this paper.  First, Section (a) 
“Prohibited acts; criminal penalties” is void for vagueness and 
chills protected speech because it is overbroad. Section (a) states: 
“No person shall, without the effective consent of the owner and 
with the intent to damage the enterprise conducted at the animal 
facility, damage or destroy an animal facility or any animal or 
property in or on an animal facility.”24  However, the terms “intent 
to damage” and “damage” are not defined in the statute.   
 
 
19 KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-1825–47-1828 (2018).  
20 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1826(b) (2018). 
21 See KAN. STAT. ANN. §47-1827(a)–(d) (2018) (providing a more detailed 
description of the prohibited conduct).  
22 Id. 
23 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(g) (2018).  
24 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(a) (2018). 
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Second, Section (c) “Prohibited acts; criminal penalties” of 
the statute states: “No person shall, without the effective consent of 
the owner and with the intent to damage the enterprise conducted at 
the facility: . . . (4) enter an animal facility to take pictures by 
photograph, video camera or by any other means.”25  As this article 
discusses in detail below, this section violates the Free Speech 
Clause of the First Amendment.  Before addressing these sections 
and comparing them with the constitutional issues addressed by the 
Ninth Circuit, the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah, and 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Iowa, this article discusses 
the recent complaint filed against the State of Kansas.      
 
B.  Animal Legal Defense Fund Files Suit  
 
i.  The Complaint  
 
On December 5, 2018, Animal Legal Defense Fund, Center 
for Food Safety, Shy 38 Inc., and Hope Sanctuary filed suit against 
the Kansas Governor and State Attorney General, alleging that the 
Kansas Farm and Field Crop and Research Facilities Protection Act 
violates the First Amendment.26  The complaint alleges (1) that the 
law is an impermissible content and viewpoint-based restriction on 
protected speech;27 and (2) that the law is overbroad.28   
 
First, Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF) alleges that the 
Act violates the First Amendment because it regulates speech based 
on the speaker’s message, which is a content-based restriction on 
protected speech.29  When the Farm Animal and Field Crop and 
Research Facilities Protection Act was enacted, the state already 
had content-neutral statutes prohibiting fraud, trespass, adulteration 
of food products, theft, theft of trade secrets, and destruction of 
property.30 Because the state has created a separate law to prosecute 
 
25 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(c) (2018). 
26 Complaint at 1, 6, ALDF v. Colyer, No. 2:18-cv-02657-KHV-JPO (D. Kan. 
Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/KS-
Ag-Gag.pdf. 
27 Id. at 28–30. 
28 Id. at 30–31. 
29 See id. at 28–29 (citing Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95–96 
(1972), holding that “laws which 
target certain messages or speech because of their ‘ideas, subject matter, or 
content’” violate the First Amendment, 
and arguing that this designation of content-based restrictions applies to the Kansas 
Ag-Gag law). 
30 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5808 (2018) (creating and describing the state crime 
of criminal trespass); KAN. STAT. ANN. 65-664 (2018) (describing the conditions 
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certain conduct and speech at animal production facilities, ALDF 
argues the law distinguishes favored speech from disfavored speech 
on the basis of ideas or viewpoints.31  The complaint alleges that 
“the law applies only to speech that involves the subject matter of 
the animal industry and its practices and is therefore content-based 
on its face.”32 
 
As the complaint notes, content-based restrictions regarding 
speech are subject to strict scrutiny.33 ALDF argues the law is 
neither justified by a compelling interest, nor narrowly tailored to 
protecting privacy, trespass, and biosecurity because the state can 
do so through less restrictive means.34     
 
ALDF’s second cause of action is that the law’s 
overbreadth amounts to a restriction on protected speech.35  ALDF 
also argues that the law has a chilling effect on speech because the 
text is vague, and violations carry a heavy criminal penalty.36  
Specifically, because the law does not define the meaning of “intent 
to damage,” it is unclear what type of conduct is prohibited.37  
Moreover, the “almost limitless” definition of animal facility38 and 
research facility39 chills speech because the statute covers an 
expansive number of forums: the complaint notes, “these broad 
definitions would include not just factory farms . . . but also . . . 
 
under which a food will be deemed adulterated); KAN. STAT. ANN. 21-5801 (2018 
(describing the crime of theft)); KAN. STAT. ANN. 60-3320 (2018); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. 21-5813 (2018) (describing the crime of criminal damage to property). 
31 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994) (explaining that 
regulations which differentiate speech on the basis of content are subject to 
exacting scrutiny, while regulations unrelated to the content of speech are subject 
to intermediate scrutiny).  
32 Complaint, supra note 26, at 28–29. 
33 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 643 (holding content-based restrictions 
are subject to strict scrutiny).  
34 Complaint, supra note 26, at 29. 
35 See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010) (holding that a law 
prohibiting substantially more speech than necessary is unconstitutional even 
though some of the conduct targeted by the law does not offend the First 
Amendment).   
36 Complaint, supra note 26, at 17–19. 
37 Complaint, supra note 26, at 13–14. 
38 Defined as “any vehicle, building, structure, research facility or premises where 
an animal is kept, handled, housed, exhibited, bred or offered for sale.  KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 47-1826(b) (2012). 
39 Defined as “any place, laboratory, institution, medical care facility, elementary 
school, secondary school, college or university, at which any scientific test, 
experiment or investigation involving the use of any living animal or field crop 
product is carried out, conducted or attempted.” KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47‒1826(i) 
(2012). 
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restaurants with lobster or fish tanks, pet stores, circuses, petting 
zoos, and elementary school classrooms with an ant farm . . . ”40  
 
The chilling effect of the law’s vagueness and broad sweep 
is compounded by the potential for criminal prosecution at the 
felony level.  ALDF indicates that “the criminal penalties are the 
same for a person who intends to take a picture in an animal facility 
without the consent of the owner as for a person who knowingly 
kills or injures an animal.”41    
 
ii.  Assessment of Complaint  
 
This article agrees with ALDF’s claims for relief—that the 
law violates the First Amendment as a content and viewpoint-based 
discrimination, and second, that the law’s overbreadth violates the 
First Amendment—while diverging from the argument that the 
entire statute is unconstitutional. 
 
As a content and view-point based discrimination, this 
article relies heavily on Reed v. Town of Gilbert, discussed in detail 
below.42  While ALDF’s complaint does not cite Reed, reference to 
this important case regarding facially content-neutral laws would 
strengthen its case.  
 
Regarding the statute’s overbreadth, ALDF focuses on the 
wide range of conduct prohibited by the law, alleging that the entire 
law is unconstitutional because “the law as a whole restricts 
substantially more speech than the First Amendment permits.”43  
This article diverges from ALDF in this allegation, because certain 
prohibited activities in the statute do not implicate speech.   
 
For example, K.S.A. § 47-1827(b) prohibits “acquir[ing] or 
otherwise exercis[ing] control over an animal facility . . .” and 
K.S.A. §§ 47-1827(e) and (f) prohibit “dama[ing] or [destroy]ing . . 
. field crops” at a private research facility or a government agency.  
 
The conduct prohibited in these sections does not implicate 
the First Amendment, and, despite the statute’s overbreadth and 
vagueness, there is a significant difference between causing 
 
40 Complaint, supra note 26, at 20. 
41 Id. at 18 (comparing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(g)(3) (2006) with KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 21- 6412(b)(2)(A) (2017)). 
42 See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2227 (2015). 
43 Complaint, supra note 26, at 30–31 (citing United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 
460, 473 (2010)). 
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physical damage to a facility versus making an undercover 
recording.  While the statute amounts to an unreasonable restraint 
on protected speech, damaging or destroying another’s property is 
not protected speech.  Thus, the Kansas District Court could find 
the sections of the statute which implicate speech unconstitutional 
while upholding the sections of the statute targeting conduct.44 
 
iii.  Comparison to Idaho, Utah, and Iowa Ag-Gag Laws  
 
This section discusses the opinions in the Idaho, Utah, and 
Iowa cases.  Notably, these three Ag-gag statutes all targeted some 
form of false speech used to obtain entry, access, or employment at 
an agriculture facility.  By contrast, the Kansas statute does not 
address false speech.  Thus, while the courts in these respective 
cases all apply the Supreme Court’s test for laws regulating false 
speech, this inquiry is not relevant in the Kansas case.45  
 
The Idaho statute was deemed unconstitutional in part, 
while the Utah and Iowa statutes were deemed unconstitutional 
entirely.  While the Kansas statute does not address false speech, it 
is still at least in-part unconstitutional.  
 
C.  ALDF v. Wasden: Idaho Ag-Gag Held Partially 
Unconstitutional  
 
The Idaho Interference with Agricultural Production law 
was passed in 2014 after an undercover video of abuse at an Idaho 
dairy was released.46  Shortly after the law was enacted, ALDF 
filed suit.  The case was eventually appealed to the Ninth Circuit, 
and a decision was released in January 2018.   
 
 
44 A discussion of conduct under the First Amendment is beyond the scope of this 
paper, though it should be noted that damaging or destroying an animal facility 
would be not considered expressive conduct.  See United States v. O’Brien, 391 
U.S. 367 (1968) (discussing the limits and considerations involved when 
considering restrictions on symbolic speech).  
45 See U.S. v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012) (holding that false speech which 
neither causes a legally cognizable harm nor inures a material gain to the speaker 
is a form of protected speech). 
46 Arin Greenwood, Court Says No to Gagging Those Who Reveal Farm Animal 
Abuse, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 5, 2015), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/id 
aho-ag-gag-law_us_55c0b399e4b06363d5a35543; Mercy for Animals, Burger 
King Cruelty—Video Exposes Horrific Animal Abuse at a Burger King Dairy 
Supplier, YOUTUBE (Oct. 9, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lNYcWOu 
Vqk& oref=https% 3A% 2F% 2Fwww.youtube.com% 2Fwatch% 3Fv% 3DlN 
YcWOuVqk& has verified1.   
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In ALDF v. Wasden, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
held two sections of Idaho’s Interference with Agricultural 
Production law unconstitutional.  First, Section (1)(a), the 
“Misrepresentation Clause,” stated: “a person commits the crime of 
interference with agricultural production if the person knowingly: 
(a) is not employed by an agricultural production facility and enters 
an agricultural facility by force, threat, misrepresentation or 
trespass.”47   
 
Second, Section (1)(d), the “Recording Clause,” prohibited 
“enter[ing] an agricultural production facility that is not open to the 
public and, without the facility owner’s express consent . . . 
mak[ing] an audio or video recording of the conduct of an 
agricultural production facility’s operation.”48  The remainder of 
Section A focuses on the Ninth Circuit’s opinion. 
 
i.  Misrepresentation Clause  
 
1.  Gaining Entry Through Misrepresentation is Protected 
Speech 
 
Assessing the constitutionality of the Misrepresentation 
Clause, the Ninth Circuit looked to U.S. v. Alvarez, in which the 
Supreme Court held unconstitutional the Stolen Valor Act, which 
criminalized false claims that the speaker had received the 
Congressional Medal of Honor.49  In Alvarez, the Court held that 
false speech is neither categorically protected nor unprotected; false 
speech made for the purpose of material gain, material advantage, 
or that inflicts a legally cognizable harm can be criminalized.50  
Other forms of false speech, which do not fall into any of the 
unprotected categories, receive constitutional protection.51  
 
The Ninth Circuit held that criminalizing entering an 
agricultural production facility by misrepresentation violated 
 
47 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(c) (2018). 
48 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(d) (2018). 
49 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 709. 
50 Id. at 712.  
51 Cf. Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184, 1195 (2018). It 
should be noted that Alvarez was a plurality decision, and there has been 
discussion in lower courts as to whether the plurality’s opinion applies, or the 
concurrence’s (Breyer, J. concurring, applying a form of intermediate scrutiny to 
protected false speech).  While considering the narrow grounds of the Alvarez 
majority, the Ninth Circuit and the District Courts for Utah and Iowa all applied 
strict scrutiny.     
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Alvarez.  The court reasoned that “lying to gain entry merely allows 
the speaker to cross the threshold of another’s property, including 
public property.”52  Lying for this purpose does not necessarily 
result in material gain or advantage for the speaker, nor does it 
inflict a legally cognizable harm on the property owner.53   
 
Because lying to gain entry is protected speech under 
Alvarez, the court assessed Section(1)(a) under strict scrutiny.  The 
court held that the state might have a compelling interest in 
regulating property rights and protecting its farm industry, but 
“criminalizing access to property by misrepresentation is not 
actually necessary to protect those rights . . . If . . . [the state’s] real 
concern is trespass, then Idaho already has a prohibition against 
trespass that does not implicate speech in any way.”54 
 
2.  Obtaining Records Through Misrepresentation is 
Unprotected Speech 
 
Conversely, Section (1)(b), which prohibits “obtain[ing] 
records of an agricultural production facility by force, threat, 
misrepresentation or trespass”55 and Section (1)(c), which prohibits 
“obtain[ing] employment with an agricultural facility by force, 
threat, or misrepresentation with the intent to cause economic or 
other injury to the facility’s operations, livestock, crops, owners, 
personnel, equipment, buildings, premises, business interests or 
customers”56 were upheld.   
 
The court held that making false statements to obtain 
records inflicts a property harm upon the owner and could result in 
material gain to the speaker and is thus unprotected speech under 
Alvarez.57  For example, a property owner suffers a legally 
cognizable harm from records obtained through false speech and 
 
52 Id. at 1195.  
53 See id. at 1194–95 (exemplifying this point, the court makes the following 
analogy: “Take, for example, a teenager who wants to impress his friends by 
obtaining a highly sought-after reservation at an exclusive pop-up restaurant that is 
open to the public.  If he were to call the restaurant and finagle a reservation in the 
name of his mother, a well-known journalist, that would be a misrepresentation.  If 
the restaurant offers up a reservation on the basis of the mother’s notoriety, 
granting a “license” to enter the premises…the teenager would be subject to 
punishment of up to one year in prison, a fine not to exceed $5,000 or both.”). 
54 Id. at 1196. 
55 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(1)(b) (2018).   
56 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(1)(c) (2018).  
57 Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1199. 
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the speaker may learn trade secrets.  Because such speech is 
unprotected, it is only subject to rational review.   
 
Regarding the Equal Protection Clause, the Ninth Circuit 
did acknowledge that the law was partially motivated by animus 
towards animal welfare groups.58  However, because animal 
welfare groups are not a traditionally suspect class, a court may 
only strike the statute “if [it] serves no legitimate government 
purpose and if impermissible animus towards an unpopular group 
prompted the statute’s enactment.”59  The court acknowledged that 
animus towards reporters and activists was a factor in passing the 
statute, but that it also serves the legitimate purpose of protecting 
agricultural production facilities from interference.60 
 
3.  Obtaining Employment Through Misrepresentation is 
Unprotected Speech 
 
The Ninth Circuit also held that Section (1)(c), which 
prohibits obtaining employment through misrepresentation with the 
intent to cause economic or other injury to the facility, does not 
offend Alvarez.  In Alvarez, the Supreme Court stated, “[w]here 
false claims are made to effect a fraud or secure moneys or valuable 
considerations, say offers of employment, it is well established that 
the Government may restrict speech without affronting the First 
Amendment.”61  Moreover, this section is limited to those seeking 
employment with intent to cause economic or other injury to the 
facility, which further narrows its scope.  
 
While this speech is unprotected, in R.A.V. v. City of St. 
Paul, the Supreme Court held that the government may offend the 
First Amendment if it makes a viewpoint distinction in regulating 
unprotected speech.62  ALDF argued that the statute’s Restitution 
Clause, which permits victims to recover twice the amount of the 
damage resulting from the statute’s violation, violated R.A.V. 
 
58 See id. at 1200–01 (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 
432, 448 (1985), holding “a bare…desire to harm a politically unpopular group 
[or] negative attitude[s] or fears about that group [do not constitute] a legitimate 
government interest for the purpose of this review.”). 
59 Id. at 1200 (citing Mountain Water Co. v. Mont. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Regulation, 
919 F.2d 593, 598 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
60 Id. at 1201. 
61 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 723. 
62 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 385 (1992) (distinguishing which 
types of features of speech can be prohibited without violating the First 
Amendment). 
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because it was enacted solely to punish whistleblowers and 
journalists, and thus suppress a specific viewpoint.63  The Ninth 
Circuit held that because the Restitution Clause is limited to 
economic loss, rather than “less tangible damage” such as 
emotional distress, the statute does not punish animal activists any 
more so than other regulations in the Idaho Penal code.64  
 
ii.  Recording Clause  
 
The Recording Clause created the crime of interference 
with agricultural production if a person knowingly “[e]nters an 
agricultural production facility that is not open to the public and, 
without the facility owner’s express consent or pursuant to judicial 
process or statutory authorization, makes audio or video recordings 
of the conduct of an agricultural production facility’s operation.”65 
 
The Ninth Circuit held that the Recording Clause violated 
the First Amendment.  As a preliminary matter, the court indicated 
that making an audio or video recording is speech protected by the 
First Amendment.66  The court then determined the Recording 
Clause was a content-based restriction because law enforcement 
would be required to view the content of the recording to determine 
before bringing charges.  Because the Recording Clause was 
deemed to be a content-based restriction, the court assessed it under 
strict scrutiny.  The court held that the clause was not narrowly 
tailored to protect agriculture production facilities because it was 
both over and under-inclusive.  The clause was held to be under-
inclusive because it did not regulate photographs and over-inclusive 
because it suppressed more speech than necessary to protect 
property and privacy.67 
 
D.  ALDF v. Herbert: Utah Ag-Gag Held Unconstitutional  
 
In 2012, the State of Utah enacted the Agricultural 
Operation Interference law, which created the crime of agricultural 
interference for certain recording activities; seeking access to an 
agriculture operation under false pretenses; and seeking 
 
63 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(4) (2018); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-5304 (2018); 
Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1202. 
64 Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1202 
65 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(1), (2) (2018).  
66 Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1203 (stating “[N]either the Supreme Court nor [the Ninth 
Circuit] has ever drawn a distinction between the process of creating a form of 
pure speech (such as writing or painting) and the product of these processes (the 
essay or artwork) in terms of First Amendment protection afforded…” 1203.  
67 Id. at 1204. 
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employment with the intent to record activities at an agriculture 
production facility.  The United States District Court for the District 
of Utah held the entire statute unconstitutional, and the State of 
Utah did not file an appeal.   
 
i.  Lying Provision: Unconstitutional Restriction on 
Protected Speech  
 
Section (2)(b) created the crime of agricultural operation 
interference if a person “obtains access to an agricultural operation 
under false pretenses.”68  The court assessed this section under the 
Alvarez standard discussed above.  The Utah District Court, like the 
Ninth Circuit in Wasden, held that Section (2)(b) infringed on 
protected speech, noting “[l]ying to gain entry, without more, does 
not itself constitute trespass.”69  Thus, because obtaining access 
through false pretenses does not necessarily result in a legally 
cognizable harm, it does not fall into a category of unprotected false 
speech under Alvarez.  The court cited numerous examples of 
speech which could be criminalized under this provision, such as a 
restaurant critic who hides her identity, a dinner guest who lies to 
his host, and a job applicant who fabricates his hobbies.70 
 
Because Section (2)(b) infringed on protected speech, it 
was assessed under strict scrutiny. The state cited four interests 
before the court: 1) protecting animals from injury resulting from 
unqualified workers; 2) protecting animals from disease brought 
into the facility by workers; 3) protecting workers from exposure to 
disease; and 4) protecting workers from injury resulting from 
unqualified workers.71 
 
The court held that even if these were compelling interests, 
the statute was not narrowly tailored to address these problems.  
The lying provision was over-inclusive in that it criminalized 
conduct unrelated to protecting these interests, and under-inclusive 
in that it did nothing to target harmful conduct resulting from 
“anyone other than an undercover investigator.”72 
 
 
 
 
68 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76–6–112. 
69 Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d 1193, 1203 (D. Utah 2017). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 1211. 
72 Id. at 1213. 
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ii.  Recording Provision: Unconstitutional Restriction on 
Protected Speech  
 
Section (2)(a), (c), and (d) created the crime of agricultural 
operation interference for various recording activities at an 
agricultural production facility.73  As a preliminary matter, the court 
held that recordings were a form of speech for First Amendment 
purposes.74  The state argued that because the Act only applied to 
speech on private property, First Amendment protections did not 
apply.  The court rejected this argument, stating “a landowner’s 
ability to exclude from her property someone who wishes to speak, 
and the government’s ability to jail the person for that speech” are 
two different concepts which the state incorrectly conflated.75 
 
The court then determined that the recording provisions 
were a content restriction because they required viewing the content 
of the recordings to determine if they were recordings of an 
agriculture operation.  Had the statute supplanted the term “of” with 
“at” the court indicated it might have assessed the provisions as 
content-neutral restrictions.”76 
 
As a content-based restriction, the court assessed the 
recording provision under strict scrutiny.  The court held that the 
state offered no clear evidence of how its interests in enacting the 
statute, discussed above, were furthered by recording restrictions.  
The recording provisions, like the lying provisions, were deemed 
unconstitutional.  
 
E.  ALDF v. Reynolds: Iowa Ag-Gag Held Unconstitutional  
 
Most recently, in January 2019, the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Iowa held the state’s “Agricultural production 
facility fraud” statute unconstitutional in a summary judgement 
motion.77  The Iowa law, enacted in 2012, created the crime of 
agricultural production facility fraud for “(a). obtain[ing] access to 
an agricultural production facility by false pretenses” and “(b). 
 
73 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 76–6–112(2)(a), (c), (d). 
74 Herbert, 263 F. Supp. at 1208 (stating that, “[b]ecause recordings themselves are 
protected by the First Amendment, so too must the making of those recordings be 
protected.  This is not to say that the State cannot regulate the act of recording; it is 
merely to say that if it wishes to do so, the State must justify and narrowly tailor 
the restriction, as with any other constraint on speech.”).  
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 1211.  
77 IOWA CODE ANN. § 717A.3A; Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Reynolds, 2019 WL 
140069 (S.D. Iowa 2019). 
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mak[ing] a false statement or representation as part of an 
application or agreement to be employed at an agricultural 
production facility, if the person knows the statement to be false, 
and mak[ing] the statement with the intent to commit an act not 
authorized by the owner . . . ”78  For a first conviction, the crime 
constituted a serious misdemeanor and for a subsequent conviction, 
the crime constituted an aggravated misdemeanor.79 
 
i.  False Speech and Employment: A Different Outcome   
Than Wasden 
 
As a preliminary matter, the Iowa District Court determined 
that the false speech at issue—both making false statements to 
access an agriculture facility and making false statements to seek 
employment at an agriculture facility—are protected forms of 
speech under Alvarez because neither instance causes a legally 
cognizable harm nor provides a material gain to the speaker.80  
Interestingly, the Iowa District Court came to a different conclusion 
regarding false speech and employment than the Ninth Circuit, 
which upheld Idaho’s restriction on obtaining employment at an 
agriculture facility through false speech.  
 
Unlike the Idaho statute, which prohibited obtaining 
“employment . . . by force, threat, or misrepresentation with the 
intent to cause economic or other injury,”81 the Iowa statute 
prohibits obtaining employment by false speech “with the intent to 
commit an act not authorized by the owner.”82  In a previous 
decision addressing the state’s motion to dismiss, the Iowa court 
held that the Ninth Circuit’s holding regarding Idaho’s employment 
clause was inapplicable because the court “placed great emphasis 
on the intent prong of the Idaho statute.”83   
 
The Iowa court reasoned that “[t]his intent provision 
cabined the application of the Idaho statute so that it only 
criminalized the sort of false statements that the plurality in 
[Alvarez] recognized the government may target . . . : those likely 
to cause material harm to others.”84  Conversely, the Iowa code 
 
78 IOWA CODE ANN. § 717A.3A(1)(a),(b) (2012). 
79 IOWA CODE ANN. § 717A.3A(2)(a),(b) (2012). 
80 Reynolds, 2019 WL at 10.  
81 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(1)(c) (2018). 
82 IOWA CODE ANN. § 717A.3A(b) (2012). 
83 Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Reynolds, 297 F. Supp. 3d 901, 924 (S.D. Iowa 
2018). 
84 Id. 
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prohibits all false speech in a job application if the speaker intends 
to commit an unauthorized act—a much broader prohibition that 
the Idaho code.  Determining section § 717A.3A(b) to be broader 
than the type of false speech the Court deemed unprotected in 
Alvarez, the Iowa court assessed section (b) under strict scrutiny.  
 
ii.  Iowa Statute Does Not Survive Strict Scrutiny  
 
In the court’s summary judgment opinion, it deemed § 
717A.3A unconstitutional.  First, the court determined the entire 
statute was a content-based restriction because the content of the 
speech—whether it was true or false—would need to be assessed to 
find an individual guilty of agriculture production facility fraud.85 
 
As a content-based restriction, the court applied strict 
scrutiny in assessing the law.86  Though dubious of the state’s 
justifications for the law (property interests and biosecurity) it still 
held that these interests were important, but not compelling.87  The 
law was also deemed unnecessary to protect these interests because 
the state made no argument explaining how false speech used to 
access or gain employment at an agriculture facility would 
compromise biosecurity.88  Finally, the court determined that 
because Iowa already has other content-neutral statutes regarding 
trespass and biosecurity, the state’s interests could be achieved by 
means which do not affront protected speech.89  As of February 14, 
2019, the Iowa Attorney General’s Office is set to file an appeal 
brief by March 20, 2019.90 
 
III.  Kansas Ag-Gag: ‘Better’ Drafted, But Partially 
Unconstitutional  
 
As the nation’s first Ag-gag law, perhaps there is a reason 
the Kansas Farm Animal and Field Crop and Research Facilities 
 
85 Reynolds, 2019 WL at 11 (citing See FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 
468 U.S. 364, 383 (1984) (holding law that prohibits broadcasting stations which 
receive federal funds from editorializing is content-based.)). 
86 Id. at 6. 
87 Id. at 7. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 8. 
90 Rox Laird, Federal Judge Strikes Down Iowa ‘Ag-Gag’ Law, https://www.court 
housenews.com/federal-judge-strikes-down-iowa-ag-gag-law/, (last visited Jan. 21, 
2019); see also Challenging Iowa’s Ag-Gag Law, Animal Legal Defense Fund 
(Feb. 14, 2019), https://aldf.org/case/challenging-iowas-ag-gag-law/ (last visited 
March 4, 2019). 
2019]    THE CLASH OF AGRICULTURAL EXCEPTIONALISM     67 
 
 
Protection Act was not challenged until 2018; it is ‘better’ drafted 
than the Idaho and Utah laws.91 
 
Notably, there is no section in the Kansas statute which 
criminalizes false speech used to enter or seek employment at an 
animal facility, so Alvarez is not relevant.  However, like the Idaho 
and Utah statutes, the Kansas statute does criminalize conduct 
involving recording and photography.   
 
 Despite its tactful drafting, certain sections are still 
constitutionally suspect.92  This section assesses these problematic 
sections of the law in light of the holdings in Reynolds, Wasden, 
and Herbert.  
 
A.  Unconstitutional Aspects of Kansas Law 
 
i.  Because Key Terms are Not Defined, the Statute is 
Overbroad and Vague 
 
1.  The Meddling Student Example93  
 
The word ‘damage’ and the clause ‘intent to damage’ are 
not defined in the statute’s definition section.  However, each 
prohibited act under § 47-1827 requires the actor have the ‘intent to 
damage’ the enterprise.94  Because the term ‘damage’ and the 
clause ‘intent to damage’ are not defined in statute’s definitions 
section, the statute chills speech and restricts more speech than 
necessary to serve its purpose.  If the term ‘damage’ were defined 
to only include activities resulting in physical damage, the 
remainder of the statute (excluding § 47-1827(c)(4)) might be 
constitutional. 
 
The Supreme Court has stated, “a law may be invalidated 
as overbroad if a substantial number of its applications are 
 
91 It should also be noted that no one has ever been prosecuted under this law.  
92 See Complaint, supra note 26, at 31 (alleging that the entire statute is 
unconstitutional on its face or, in the alternative, that Kan. Stat. § 47-1827(c)(4), 
(c)(1), (c)(3), Kan. Stat. § 47-1827(a), (b), (c)(2), and (d)(1) are unconstitutional as 
applied to Plaintiff.) For purposes of this paper, I only argue that Sections Kan. 
Stat. § 47-1827(a) and (c)(4) are unconstitutional.  
93This example was inspired by the Ninth Circuit’s factious teenager who lies 
about his identity in order to secure a reservation at an exclusive restaurant, thus 
implicating Idaho Code § 18–7042(1)(a).  See Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1195.  
94 § 47-1827(b) is the only prohibited act with a different standard, requiring the 
actor have the “intent to deprive the owner of such facility.”  
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unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly 
legitimate sweep.”95  Even if aspects of the law are constitutional, 
under the overbreadth doctrine, the court considers that “the threat 
of enforcement of an overbroad law [will] dete[r] people from 
engaging in constitutionally protected speech.”96 
 
In this instance, the word ‘damage’ and the term ‘intent to 
damage’ could mean many things and runs the risk of criminalizing 
perfectly legitimate forms of speech.  For example, does the statute 
criminalize economic, emotional, or physical damage, or all three?   
 
There is also a timing issue: must the speaker have the 
intent to damage the enterprise before she engages in her speech 
activity, or can she be charged if her intent changes from the time 
she made a recording or photograph to the time of disseminating 
the information?  
 
To exemplify the statute’s overbreadth, consider the 
following hypothetical activity which could be criminalized under 
the statute.  A school group offers a tour to a local animal 
production facility as part of a field trip for a science class.  Though 
the students are told in advance not to take any photos inside, a 
student nonetheless hides his phone in his pocket before the field 
trip because he plans to take a photo, just for fun.  The student has 
signed up for the field trip because his friends dared him to take a 
photo inside.   
 
  Once inside, he takes a particularly gruesome photo of an 
animal carcass being processed.  The student entered the facility an 
omnivore, but, when he returns home and views the photo, he 
realizes he is disgusted by the facility and becomes a vegetarian.  
Wanting to share his news and hoping to persuade others in his 
network to stop eating meat, he posts the photo to his Facebook 
page, and in the caption, he names the animal production facility 
and tells his friends that they should stop eating meat because of the 
atrocities he witnessed at the facility.  A few of his friends view the 
photo, are also disgusted by it, and decide to stop eating meat.   
 
Under Section (c)(4), the student could be criminally 
prosecuted.  By captioning the facility’s name in his photo and 
hoping to convert his friends to vegetarianism, the student had the 
 
95 Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 
449  n.6 (2008) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615). 
96 United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2018). 
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“intent to damage the enterprise.”  Because he planned to take the 
photo in advance of entering the facility, he entered “to take 
pictures.”  For his actions, the student could be fined and charged 
with a misdemeanor or felony, depending on the extent of his 
damage.  Whether the facility owner might have recourse in a 
private tort action (which is beyond the scope of this paper), the 
State cannot lawfully criminalize such conduct without infringing 
on First Amendment rights.97  
 
2.  Kansas Attorney General Opinion Letter Does Not 
Ameliorate Statute’s Issues  
 
Following the statute’s enactment, the Kansas Attorney 
General released Opinion Letter No. 90-72 on the issue of the 
meaning of “intent to damage.”98  The letter does little to clarify 
any confusion surrounding the statue’s vagueness and overbreadth, 
and moreover, the letter is not binding law.99   
 
  The letter states that the specific intent to damage the 
enterprise conducted at the facility is a required element of the 
crime, and such intent is determined by a judge or jury based on the 
totality of circumstances surrounding the event.   
 
Responding to the question of what “damages” means, the 
Opinion Letter essentially ‘punts’ on the issue.  The most definitive 
statement in the letter says, “[u]pon conviction, restitution may be 
ordered in an amount sufficient to compensate the victim for the 
loss suffered.  In a civil action compensatory damages may include 
out-of-pocket loss as well as consequential damages.”100  So, if 
damages constitute any form of quantifiable harm, perhaps any 
intent is sufficient to implicate charges so long as the victim’s 
losses are quantifiable.  This logic is purely speculative and does 
little to clarify the meaning of ‘intent to damage.’ 
 
97 Note that the State of Utah argued that the First Amendment was inapplicable to 
its Ag-gag statute because the law only regulated speech on private property.  The 
Utah District Court was quick to reject this argument, noting that the state had 
conflated the difference between “a landowner’s ability to exclude from her 
property someone who wishes to speak, and the government’s ability to jail the 
person for that speech.”  The former does not affront the First Amendment, while 
the latter does. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. at 1208. 
98 See Livestock and Domestic Animals -- Farm Animal and Research Facilities 
Protection Act -- 1990 Senate Bill No. 776 Op. Kan. Att’y Gen. No. 90-72 (1990), 
http://ksag.washburnlaw.edu/opinions/1990/1990-072.pdf (last visited Ma. 10, 
2019).  
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 10.  
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i.  The Pictures Clause Fails First Amendment Scrutiny as 
Either Content-Based or Content-Neutral Restriction 
 
Section (c) of Prohibited acts; criminal penalties states: 
“[n]o person shall, without the effective consent of the owner and 
with the intent to damage the enterprise conducted at the animal 
facility . . . (4) enter an animal facility to take pictures by 
photograph, video camera or by other means.”101  This section 
infringes on protected speech in violation of the First Amendment 
as either a content-based or content-neutral restriction on speech.102  
 
 The first step in assessing this section under the First 
Amendment is to determine if it infringes on protected speech.  The 
Supreme Court has held movies to be protected by the First 
Amendment.103  And in United States v. Stevens, the Court stated 
“visual [and] auditory depiction[s], such as photographs, videos, or 
sound recordings” are subject to the First Amendment.104  It 
logically follows that the act of creating a film, photo, or recording 
must receive some level of protection as well, and neither the Ninth 
Circuit, the Utah District Court, nor the Iowa District Court 
considered otherwise.  Thus, protected speech is at issue.    
 
1.  Assessed as Content-Neutral Restriction  
 
Section (c)(4) prohibits entering an animal facility “to take 
pictures by photograph, video camera, or by other means.”105  This 
section is notably different from both the Idaho and Utah statutes in 
that it does not prohibit taking pictures or recordings of an 
agriculture production facility, but rather at an animal production 
facility.106   
 
Because this section limits where a photo or recording can 
be made, rather than regulating the photo or videos content, it might 
be deemed a content-neutral regulation.  In Herbert, responding to 
the state’s argument that the recording provision was a content-
neutral restriction, the Utah District Court stated, “[t]hat might be 
 
101 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(c)(4) (2018). 
102 There is also a timing issue here, as discussed above in the meddling student 
example. Must the actor have the intent to damage the enterprise before she enters?  
This uncertainty contributes to the statute’s overbreadth and vagueness.  
103 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952).   
104 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010). 
105 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(c)(4) (2018). 
106 Id.  
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so if the Act criminalized recording an imagine at an agricultural 
operation.  But the Act criminalizes recording an image of an 
agricultural operation.  The distinction is not trivial . . . the use of 
“of” rather than “at” means the Act does not bar all filming at an 
agricultural operation, so it is not location based.”107   
 
Following the rationale of the Utah District Court, the 
Kansas recording provision should be assessed as a content-neutral 
restriction.  Though there are different variations of the content-
neutral test, the Supreme Court commonly asks if the law “is 
designed to serve a substantial government interest and [does] not 
unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication.”108 
 
Even assuming the Kansas legislature has a substantial 
interest in protecting its farmers and ranchers, it is dubious that the 
law does not ‘unreasonably limit alternative avenues of 
communication.’   
 
Individuals and groups who wish to disseminate 
information and exposés of animal production facilities essentially 
have no other avenue of communication under this law.  The 
hypothetical “alternative avenues of communication” do not 
measure up to the prohibited conduct. For example, an individual 
could seek the owner’s consent to film or photograph, but clearly 
what the individual would see while undercover at a facility would 
be different than what the individual would see during a planned 
visit.  
 
 And given the tight security at animal production facilities, 
there is essentially no way to take photos or recordings from the 
outside.  Alternatively, an entity or individual wishing to expose 
abuses at an animal production facility could interview a willing 
employee, but the differences between reading an interview versus 
viewing images or audio recordings is significant.  A business can 
prohibit individuals from recording or taking photos on its property, 
but the state cannot lawfully criminalize such conduct. Because the 
 
107 Herbert, 263 F. Supp. at 1211. 
108 City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 41 (1986). See also 
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294 (1984); United 
States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177; Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' 
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); U.S. Postal Serv. v. Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453 
U.S. 114, 132 (1981); Heffron v. Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consc., 452 U.S. 640, 647-
48 (1981) (illustrating that the Court commonly asks whether a law regarding 
speech is designed to serve a substantial government interest and does not limit 
alternate avenues of communication). 
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law limits the only legitimate avenue for this speech to occur, it 
infringes on protected speech if it is deemed content-neutral.  
 
2.  Assessed as Content-Based Restriction  
 
Despite the text of Section (c)(4), and the distinction drawn 
by the Utah District Court between the term “at” and “of,” it is not 
clear if the Kansas recording provision is actually content-neutral.  
Arguably, Section (c)(4) is content-based. 
 
In Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the Supreme Court stated, “our 
precedents have . . . recognized a separate and additional category 
of laws that, though facially content-neutral, will be considered 
content-based regulations of speech: laws that cannot be justified 
without reference to the content of the regulation of speech or that 
were adopted by the government because of disagreement with the 
message [the speech] conveys.  Those laws, like those that are 
content-based on their face, must also satisfy strict scrutiny.”109 
 
The Kansas statute is content-based under the Gilbert logic.  
First, the law cannot be justified without reference to its content.  
For example, although the law prohibits recordings and taking 
photos at an animal production facility, it only singles out those 
made with the intent to damage the enterprise.  Viewing the 
contents of the photo or recording is important, if not necessary, to 
determine the actor’s intent.  For example, a photograph of a sunset 
taken at an animal production facility is probably not taken with the 
intent to damage the enterprise.  But a photograph of animal abuse 
is likely taken to expose the conduct and cause the enterprise 
economic damage.  Thus, Section (c)(4) cannot be justified without 
viewing the content of the photo or recording.   
 
Second, the law regulates the content of speech because the 
government disagrees with the speaker. In Gilbert, the Court further 
stated, “government regulation of speech is content-based if a law 
applies to a particular speech because of the topic discussed or the 
idea or message expressed.” In this instance, the state already has 
other laws on its books which protect privacy, trespass, and 
biosecurity.110  Why the state should need an additional law 
singling out speech at an agriculture production facility is unclear 
 
109 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015).  
110 Complaint, supra note 26, at 29. 
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and is only justified by a desire to suppress speech on the topic of 
animal welfare.111 
 
Because Section (c)(4) is content-based under the 
“additional category” of laws recognized in Gilbert, it will only be 
upheld if it meets strict scrutiny, a standard most laws infringing on 
protected speech are unable to meet.  
 
 Under strict scrutiny, a law must be narrowly tailored to 
serve a compelling state interest.  While the state may have a 
compelling interest in protecting its agriculture production 
facilities, the law is not narrowly tailored to this interest because, as 
mentioned above, other laws are already on the books in Kansas 
that protect these interests and do not infringe on speech.  Under 
strict scrutiny, this section fails.  
 
IV.  Conclusion  
 
The outcome of four prior cases striking Ag-gag legislation 
indicates an ominous fate for the Kansas Farm Animal and Field 
Crop and Research Facilities Protection Act.  While the statute’s 
Picture’s Clause uses different language from the Pictures Clauses 
in Idaho and Utah respectively, it too fails to meet the demands of 
strict scrutiny for the reasons discussed above.  Moreover, the 
vague meaning of ‘damage’ and ‘intent to damage’ creates an issue 
of overbreadth.  
 
While the entire Farm Animal and Field Crop and Research 
Facilities Protection Act might not violate the First Amendment, 
whether these laws are good public policy is an entirely separate 
question. The State of Kansas and the remaining six states with Ag-
gag laws might rationalize these laws with trespass or property 
damage concerns, but there is no rational justification to suppress 
speech in the process.  Ag-gag laws are yet another example of 
legislation which affords agriculture special status.  While 
agricultural exceptionalism’s pervasiveness in U.S. history and law 
is unlikely to shift in the immediate future, it must always yield to 
the First Amendment.  
 
111 Even if the state has a compelling interest in protecting the property of animal 
facilities from physical damage—and it is not even clear this was the state’s real 
interest in enacting the law—prohibiting recording and photography is not 
necessary to further this interest.  
